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EsTATE OF RADOVICH

[L. A. No. 24034.

In Bank.

[48 C.2d

Mar. 15, 1957.]

Estate of JACK R. RADOVICH, Deceased. ROBERT C.
KIRKWOOD, as State Controller, Appellant, v. CITIZENS NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK
OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents.

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

lb] Decedents' Estates-Jurisdiction-Nature.-The jurisdiction of the probate court is a jurisdiction in rem, the res being
the decedent's estate which is to be administered and distributed with regard to the rights of creditors, devisees,
legatees and all the world.
!d.-Heirship Proceedings-Nature.-An heirship proceeding
is not an ordinary civil action but a specialized proceeding in
rem, wherein the res is the right of heirship and distribution,
and as to that issue the decree is binding on the whole world.
!d.-Heirship Proceedings-Conclusiveness of Decree.-An
heirship proceeding is conclusive against all persons as the
basis for the decree of distribution which is to follow; it
settles the rights of all persons claiming as heirs of the
decedent whether or not they are named in the complaint or
personally served with summons.
!d.-Heirship Proceedings-Decree.-An heirship decree is not
one in personam in favor of one of the parties against the
other but, as founded in a specialized proceeding in rem,
the decree, when rendered, is a solemn declaration of the
status of the thing and ipso facto renders it what the decree
declares it to be.
Id.-Jurisdiction-Notice.-By giving the notice prescribed by
statute for probate proceedings, the entire world is called
before the probate court, and the court acquires jurisdiction
over all persons for the purpose of determining their rights
to any portion of the estate, and every person who may assert
any right or interest therein is required to present his claim
to the court for its determination.
!d.-Distribution-Effect of Decree-Persons Concluded.Where the requisite statutory notice for probate proceedings

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 18 et seq.;
Am.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 23 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 659 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, §§ 14, 24; [2]
Decedents' I~states, § 982; [3, 9] Decedents' E'states, § 991; [ 4, 8,
12] Decedents' Estates, § 989; [5] Decedents' Estates, § 22; [6]
Decedents' J<jstates, § 1055; [7] Taxation, § 411; [10] Decedents'
Estates, §§ 986.1, 989; [11] Taxation, § 424(3).
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has been
a decree of distribution 1s
binding on au
interested person who fails to appear and
his claim
as on one whose claim, after presentation, has been disallowed
the court.
f7] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Nature.-The tax
the Inheritance Tax Law is on the right to succeed to property
of the estate, rather than on the property itself.
[8] Decedents' Estates-Heirship Proceedings-Effect, of Decree.vVhere an heirship decree adjudges that a person over the age
of 21 years was in equity the adopted son of decedent and
therefore entitled to succeed to decedent's property as an heir,
the State Controller may not claim that, in absence of statutory adoption proceedings, he inherits as a stranger.
(9] !d.-Heirship Proceedings-Conclusiveness of Decree.-Although the probate court's conclusion in hPirship proceedings
as to a person's right to inherit ns the adopted son of decedent
may have been erroneous, where it was reached in an action in
rem which has become final it is binding in subsequent inheritance tax proceedings.
[10] !d.-Heirship Proceedings-Parties: Effect of Decree.--The
state is not a proper party to an heirship procPeding (Proh.
Code, § 1080 et seq.), but this does not preclude an heirship
decree as to a person's right to inherit as an adopted son of
the decedent from being binding on the state.
[11] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Exemptions Based on Relationship.-Only an heir may inherit; and where a person
who was taken into decedent's home pursuant to an agreement
with the parents that he would be considered decedent's
son was not a grantee, donee, vendee, assignee or beneficiary
of decedent, but for purposes of probating the estate was
adjudged in heirship procePdings to be in equity an adopted
son of decedent, he took decedent's estate as an adopted child
and heir and hence was a Class A transferee under Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 13307, sub d. (h), providing that such a transferee is one whose relationship to decedent is that of a child
adopted by decedent in conformity with state laws.
[12] Decedents' Estates-Heirship Proceedings-Effect of Decree.
-Where an inheritance tax to be levied depends in the first
instance on the probate court's findings as to heirship and a
person's right to succeed to decedent's estate, a finding that
such person had the equitable status of an adopted son of
decedent and was entitled to the estate is binding on the state
as well as on all others.

[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Inheritance and Gift Taxes, § 2; Am.Jur.,
Inheritance, Estate and Gift Taxes, § 9 et seq.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County sustaining objections to report of inheritance
tax appraiser and which fixed an inheritance tax. Victor R.
Hansen, Judge. Affirmed.
James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, \Valter
II. Miller, Chief Assistant Inheritance Tax Attorney, "William
R Elam and Milton A. Huot, Assistant Inheritance Tax
Attorneys, for Appellant.
Louis 'l'homas Hiller, Nat \Vilk, Seudder & ForrlA and
George A. Forde for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal by the Controller of the
State of California from a judgment of the suprrior court,
sitting in probate, which sustained respondent Grorge Radovich's objections to the report of the inheritance tax appraiser
and which fixed the inheritance tax on the estate of ,Jack R.
Radovich, deceased.
The facts are not in dispute.
In 1934, when George Vukoye (now legally known as George
Radovich) was 17 years of age, his natural parents entered
into an oral agreement with the decedent, Jack R. Radovich,
whereby George was to live with Jack who promised that he
would consider George his son and would adopt him. George
lived with Jack until Jack's death in October, 1953, changed
his name to George Radovich and was publicly acknowledged
by Jack as his son and the heir to his estate. During the
time George lived with Jack, he worked in Jack's liquor
store, conducted himself as a natural child and considered
himself the son of Jack. Jack died intestate without having
married or leaving issue of his body. He left no father or
mother surviving him but did leave some blood relatives in
Yugoslavia.* Jack had not, during his lifetime, instituted
formal proceedings for the adoption of George.
On the death of Jack, the Citizens National Trust and
Savings Bank of Los Angeles and Novak D. Novcic, a nephew
of the decedent, were appointed as coadministrators of Jack's
estate. On .Tune 14, 1954, George filed a petition in the probate proceeding to determine his heirship in the estate of
,Tack. After a hearing, .Judge ,John Gee Clark made findings
*George agreed in writing to transfer and assign $55,000 of the
eHtatP to the blood relatives in Yugoslavia.
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(whicl_yincludrd the.facts her:to~ore se~ forth) an? concluded
that ~George I{adoviCh occupies m eqmty the eqmtable status
of an adopted son and by reason thereof is entitled to distribution of all of the Estate of the decedent.'' A decree
was then entered on the findings of fact to the effect that
George had the equitable status of an adopted son of the
decedent and was entitled to all of the estate (with the
exception of the sum transferred to the relatives in Yugoslavia). Although the heirship proceeding was contested no
appeal was taken and that decree is now final/
Subsequent to the decree of the probate court, an inheritance tax appraiser was appointed who filed his report claiming
that George H.adovich was a stranger in blood to the decedent
and that he should be allowed a specific exemption of $50
as a Class D transferee and computing the inheritance tax
due at the rate of a stranger under sections 13310 and 13407
of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The bank, Novak Novcic,
and George filed objections to the report of the inheritanee
tax appraiser under section 14510 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. A hearing was had before Judge Hansen who
filed findings of faet, eonelusions of law and a memorandum
opinion and signed a judgment determining that George was
a Class A transferee (adopted ehild). This appeal followed
that judgment.
The only question involved here and one whieh is of first
impression in this state is whether under the facts presented
George is a Class A transferee. Seetion 13307 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code provides that a Class A transferee is
'' (b) A transferee whose relationship to the deeedent is that
of a child adopted by the decedent in conformity with the laws
of this State, provided such child was under the age of 21
years at the time of such adoption."
It is contended by appellant that since George was not
adopted in conformity with the statutory requirements of
this state that he takes as a stranger and only because of the
eontract made by his natural parents with the decedent. Respondents contend that the heirship proceeding in which it
was declared that George was, in equity, the adopted son of
the decedent is a final judgment in rem which is binding on
the appellant and all others. It is also argued by respondents
that the words of the statute "adopted by the decedent in
conformity with the laws of this state" (emphasis added)
should be construed to mean not only in conformity with the
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law of this state but the law as set forth by a decision
of a court of
jurisdidion. Hespondents also argue
that George took the money by inhet·itance; that a stranger
may not inherit; that it was only by reason of his inheritance
that George is subject to an inheritance tax.
[la, 2] This court has held (Estate of Wise, 34 Cal.2d
376 [210 P.2d 497]) that the jurisdiction of the probate court
is a jurisdiction in rem; that an heirship proceeding is not
an
civil action, but a specialized proceeding in rem.
The res is the right of heirship and distribution and as to that
issue the decree is binding on the whole world. [3] We said
there that "so it has been said that such heirship 'decree [is]
eonclnsive against all persons' as the 'basis for the decree
of distribution which [is] to follow' (Estate of Blythe, 110
Cal. 231, 234 [42 P. 643]); it settles 'the rights of all persons
claiming as heirs of the decedent, whether or not they are
uamed in the complaint or personally served with summons'
(Title & Docmnent Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289,
307 [88 P. 356, 119 Am.St.Hep. 199, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 682]) ....
[ 4] rrhe decree is not one 'in personam in favor of one of
the parties against another.' (Edlund v. Superior Coud, 209
Cal. 690, 695 [289 P. 841].) Hather, as founded in a specialized proceeding in rem-' not against persons as such, but
against or upon the thing or subject matter itself'-the decree,
when rendered, 'is a solemn declaration of the status of the
thing, and ipso facto renders it what the [decree] declares
it to be.' ( 11A Cal.J ur. § 73, p. 135, and cases there cited.)
While it may 'not be questioned that justice and sound policy
n;t!uire that the estates of decedents be distributed to persons
rightfully entitled thereto and that every concern and endeavor of a probate court should be to the accomplishment
of that purpose,' that does not mean that a 'valid decree'
determinative of rights 'of distribution ... when once final,
may be disturbed at the behest of any rightful claimant,
known or unknown, when the decree was rendered, for it is
the well-settled policy of the law to preserve the inviolability
of final judgments and decrees of courts of law and equity,
and a valid decree of a court of probate partakes of the nature
of such judgments.' (Edlund v. Snperior Court, supra, 209
Cal. 690, 695.)" (See also 29 Cal.Jur.2d § 294, p. 273.)
Section 1908, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that the effect of a judgment or final order is as
follows: ''In case of a judgment or order against a specific
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in
to the probate of a will, or the admi nistrato the personal,
tion of the estate of a decedent, or in
politieal, or legal condition or relation of a particular person,
the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing, the will, or administration, or the condition or relation
of the person." [1b] In Abels v.
126 Cal.App. 48,
53 [14 P.2d 594], it was held: "The
of the probate court is a jurisdiction in rem, the res being the estate
of the decedent which is to he administered and distributcrl
with regard to tbe rights of creditors, devisees, legatees and
all the world. (Warren Y. Ellis, 39 Cal.App. 542 [179 P.
644] ; Nicholson v. Leatham, 28 Cal.App. 5D7 [153 P. 965, 155
P. 98].) [5] By giving the notiee prescribed by the statute, the entire world is callc(l before the court, and tlw court
acquires jurisdiction over all persons for the purpose of detrrmining thrir rightR to any portio11 of the
and every
person who may assert any right or interest therein is
required to present his claim to the court for its determination.
'Whether he appears and presents his claim, or fails to appear,
the action of the court is equally conelusive upon him, ' "subject only to be[ing] reversed, set aside, or modified on
appeal.'' ' [6] The decree is as binding upon him if he
fails to appear and present his claim, as if his claim, after
presmtation, had been disallowed by the court. (1Villiarn
Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359 [48 P. 323]; J11ulcahey v.
Dow, 131 Cal. 73 [63 P. 158]; Hanley v. Hanley, supra [114
Cal. G90 ( 46 P. 736)].) " (See also Bath v. Valdez, 70 Cal.
350, 361 [11 P. 724]; Barnard v. Wilson, 74 Cal. 512, 5]6 [16
~07]; Howell v. Buclcl, 91 Cal. 342, 349, 350 [27 P. 747] .)
• In the heirship proceedings, it was adjudged that George
was entitled to inherit all of ,Jack's estate, and for the purposes of probating the estate he was adjudged to he in eqniiy
''an adopted son.'' That determination has long ;;inee breome
finaL/
[7] In Estate of Bloom, 213 Cal. 575, 580 [2 P.2d 753],
it was held that the tax imposed by the Inheritanee Tax La~,.
is on the right to succeed to the property of the rstate, rather
than upon the property itself. (Estate of Letchworth, 201
Cal. 1 [255 P. 195] .) [8] The heirship decree adjudging
that George was, in equity, the adopted son of Jack, and
therefore entitled to succeed to his property, as an heir, was
the basis for the imposition of the inheritance tax. Inasmuch
as George takes Jack's estate only by reason of the adjudica-
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tion of his status as Jack's adopted son and heir, it appears
that appellant may not claim that he inherits as a stranger.
[9] The conclusion of the trial court sitting in probate as
to George's right to inherit as the adopted son of Jack may
have been erroneous but it was an action in rem which is now
final. In Estate of Dattghaclay, 168 Cal. 63 [141 P. 929], it
was held that even if a decree establishing title under the
McEnerney Act was mistaken in fact, it nevertheless stood
as a conclusive adjudication in rrm binding upon the whole
world. In Woods v. Secnrity-First Nat. Bank, 46 Cal.2d
697, 703, 704 [299 P.2d 657], where the plaintiff had instituted heirship proceedings and where the court's decision
had become final "long before the commencement of the
present action," we held that "Whatever reasoning prompted
the court in arriving at its conclusion that the plaintiff was
entitled to one-half is not now important. The court had the
right to decide the question at issue, as the plaintiff in asserting that he was an heir was thereby claiming through the
estate and not adversely to it. (Central Bank v. Sttperior
Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 16-17 [285 P.2d 906] .) It mattered not
whether the court sitting in probate found the property to
be community or separate. It had the power to decide the
question of heirship presented in the petition and the determination therein is res judicata."
[10] Appellant contends that the probate decree as to
George's right to inherit as an adopted son is not binding
upon the state inasmuch as the state could not have been a
party to the heirship proceeding. Appellant's argument that
the state was not a proper party to the heirship proceeding
is quite correct (Pro b. Code, §§ 1080 et seq.) but it appears,
also, that the appellant's argument is inconsistent with its
attempt to tax the inheritance here involved by classifying
George as a stranger (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13310). Section
13306 defines ''transferee'' as any person to whom a transfer
is made, and includes any legatee, devisee, heir, next of kin,
grantee, donee, vendee, assignee, successor, survivor, or beneficiary. Section 13307 defines Class A transferees as a husband, wife, lineal ancestor, or lineal issue of the decedent,
or an adopted child, or a transferee to whom the decedent
stood in the mutually acknowledged relationship of a parent
for not less than 10 years prior to the transfer if the relationship commenced on or before the transferee's fifteenth
birthday, or the lineal issue of a child of the adopted child,
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or the mutually acknowledged child of the decedent. Section 13808 defines Class B transferees as the brother, sisor descendant of a brother or sister of the decedent,
or the descendant of a brother or sister of the father or
mother of the decedent. Class D transferees are defined by
section 13310 as any transferee who is not in any of the
(:lasses above mentioned. [11] Since only an heir may inherit and since George was not a grantee, donee, vendee,
assignee, or beneficiary of Jack, it follows that in view of the
probate decree he took ,Jack's estate as his adopted child and
lwir ( § 1:3307, subd. (b)) and appellant's argume11t must fail.
Although no case directly in point has been cited to us, nor
has independent research rm.·eal(•d any, it has been held in a
proceeding under the aet of 1889 which supplemented the
Wright Irrigation Act, that the confirmation of the validity
of an organization of an irrigation district and the bonds
issued thereby was a procerding in rem and that the judgm('nt therein bound the whole world, including the state
(People v. Linda Vista Irr. Dist., 128 Cal. 477 [61 P. 86] ).
(See also People v. Perris Irr. Dist., 132 Cal. 289 [64 P.
i399, 77i3J; and 29 Cal.Jur.2c1 § 296, p. 276.) It has also been
held (Brooks v. United States, 84 F'.Supp. 622) that the decree of a California court of general jurisdiction which found
that half of the community property was the property of the
decedent and that the other half should be distributed to his
surviving widow as her half, was binding on the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue in determining plaintiff's community
interests. [12] It clearly appears that since the inheritance
tax to be levied depended in the first instance on the probate
court's findings as to heirship and George's right to succeed
to the property (Estate of Letchworth, 201 Cal. 1 r255 P.
195]), such finding must be binding on the state as well as
on all others. vYe said in In re Miller, 31 Cal.2d 191, 199
[187 P.2d 722], in speaking of the Inheritance Tax Act of
19:35, that "As with a succession statute, death is the 'generating source' for the operation of the inheritance tax, consistent with the commonly accepted theory that such tax is
imposed on the right to receive a decedent's property. (28
Am.Jur. §§ 9 and 10, p. 12.) While such tax is assessed upon
the value of property so transmitted, the rates and exemptions
are based upon the relationship of the recipient to the decedent. (28 Am.Jur. § 4, p. 9.) Accordingly, a cardinal
purpose of the inheritance tax law would be to coordinate
its assessment as closely as possible with the substantive pro-
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bate law regulating the distribution of the decedent's estate."
It follows from what we have heretofore said regarding
the conclusive nature of the decree with respect to the status
of George in the heirship proceeding, that the judgment appealed from must be, and is, affirmed.
Gibson, C.
curred.

Shenk,

Traynor, J., and Spence,

;r.,

con-

SCHAuER, J., Dissenting.-In my view the majority
opinion errs in holding that the decree in the so-called heirship proceeding is conelusive as to the tax proceeding and
that the argument of the State Controller constitutes an
attack on the heirship decree. Because such opinion may well
be cited for far-reaching effects in the future I deem it proper
to record here the principal arguments against it.
If established principles were adhered to, this appeal should
be resolved primarily by application of pertinent sections of
the California Inheritance rrax Law (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13301 et seq.) and secondarily on the statutory and decisional law of adoption. Applying the tax law consistently
with the adoption law leads to the conclusion that George
Radovich should be regarded, for purposes of assessing the
inheritance tax, as a Class D rather than a Class A transferee. More specifically, it will appear from the facts and
law hereinafter elucidated, that the very decree which George
relies on as adjudicating his Class A status, conclusively
establishes facts leading to the conclusion that he is in Class
D. Hence, the judgment appealed from should be reversed.
Following the death of Jack Radovich, George Radovich
petitioned the probate court for a "Decree Determining Interests" in the decedent's estate. The court in that proceeding found that the decedent had died intestate, and had
left no surviving spouse, issue, descendants of any deceased
child, or parents; however, that decedent had left surviving
him certain brothers and sisters and their descendants, all
but one of whom are residents of Yugoslavia.
The court further found that ''the decedent and the natural
parents of George Radovich, and George Radovich, then
known as George Vukoye and17 years of age, entered into an
oral agreement in the year 1934 . . . [under the terms of
which] the decedent promised and agreed that if said George
Radovich would go to live with decedent and be decedent's
son, decedent would give to said George Radovich all of the
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of a natural son of decedent and would regard said
Radovich as decedent's own son and that he would
said George Radovich"; that George's natural parents,
in reliance upon the agreement, relinquished to decedent all
of their rights in George as natural parents; that George
accepted the oral agreement and immediately went to live
with decedent and thereafter, until decedent's death in 1953,
performed all of the duties of a child towards a parent; that
during the period in which George resided with the decedent,
the decedent publicly acknowledged George as his own son
and heir to his estate, but he "did not institnte any statutory
J?roeeedings for adoption of said George Radovich; . . . [and
that] pursuant to said or·al agreement and his [George's]
performance thereof, and by reason of the failure of decedent
to fully perform the obligations assumed by him to be performed under said oral agreement, George Radovich occupies
in equity the eq1l.itable status of an acloptecl son ancl by
reason the1·eof is entitled to dist1·ibntion of all of the Estate of
the decedent, except that portion thereof which [George
agreed to transfer to the Yugoslavian relatives]." (Italics
added.) The court ordered a distribution of the estate in
accordance with this latter finding. Such distribution was
made, and the court order has since become final.
The inheritance tax appraisers determined that George i;;;
a stranger to the blood of the decedent, and assessed the inheritance tax based on the amount of the estate passing to
George at the rate and with the exemption applicable to
strangers in blood. George, claiming to be entitled to the
more beneficial tax rate and exemption accorded to an adopted
child, objected to this assessment, and instituted the present
proceeding. The trial court found (more accurately, concluded, in the proceeding now before us on direct attack)
that under the decree of the probate court, ''George Radovich was able to succeed to the decedent's estate and be distributed the property of said estate, only by virtue of the
rstablishment of his status as an adopted son, and that the
said George Radovich inherited the property from the said
estate as a result of having the status of an adopted son'' ;
and that "the determination of the Probate Court that said
George Radovich had the status of an adopted son of the
decedent was the determination that said George Radovich
was adopted by the decedent in conformity with the laws of
this state when under the age of 21 years." The court concluded that George, as an adopted son, was a Class A trans-
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feree under the inheritance tax statutes and should be taxed
accordingly.
As is hereinafter developed, the "findings" of the trial
court in this proceeding that the court sitting in exercise of
probate jurisdiction had decreed that George had been
adopted in conformity with the laws of this state while under
the age of 21 years, that his status as a lawfully adopted
son was established, and that he inherited the decedent's estate
as an adopted son, are untenable as a matter of law. Moreover, the following analysis of the controlling inheritance tax
statutes, in the light of the findings and decree in the heirship
proceeding, appears to me to demonstrate that George has the
status of a Class D, rather than a Class A, transferee.
Inheritance tax is imposed upon the right to succeed to
the property of the estate rather than upon the property itself (Estate of Bloom (1931), 213 Cal. 575, 580 [4] 12 P.2d
753]), and is imposed not merely upon the passing of property by inheritance or under a will, but upon "every transfer"
subject to the inheritance tax statutes (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13401). It is intended that the passing of "any property"
from the estate of a decedent be subject to the tax imposed
(see Hev. & Tax. Code, § 13304), and the amount of tax is
determined by the relationship of the transferee to the decedent (In re Miller (1947), 31 Cal.2d191, 199 [4] [187 P.2d
722] ) . A transferee is "any person to whom a transfer is
made, and includes any legatee, devisee, heir, next of kin,
grantee, donee, vendee, assignee, successor, survivor, or beneficiary." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13306.) The statute specifics
four different classes of transferees; a Class A transferee includes one "whose relationship to the decedent is that of a
child adopted by the decedent in conformity with the laws
of this State, provided such child was under the age of 21
years at the time of such adoption.'' (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13307, subd. (b).)
George Hadovich was a transferee within the meaning of
the above stated rules, and as such the transfer to him was
subject to the tax. Under the facts of this case it is clear
that if George is not a Class A transferee as an adopted son
then he is a Class D transferee as a stranger to the blood of
the decedent. Thus, the sole question to be determined is
whether, within the meaning of the controlling tax statute,
George can be classified as an adopted son for purposes of
computation of the applicable tax.
A statutory grant of exemption from taxation is "strictly

<
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to the end that such concession will be neither ennor extended beyond the plain meaning of the language
" (Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. County of Los
(1950), :-\5 Cal.2d 729, 734 [1] [221 P.2d 31, 15
A.L.H.2d 10±5] ; see also Cypress Lawn C. Assn. v. San Francisco ( 1931), 211 Cal. 387, 390 [1] [295 P. 813] .) While
it has been held that the rule of strict construction of statutory
in favor of the state does not apply to the
rate sections of the Inheritance 'I'ax Law (Rev. & Tax. Code,
~·~ 13401-13404) (Estate of Morris (1943), 56 Cal.App.2d
7iG, 727 [5] [133 P.2d 452]), such rule does apply to the
exemption sections (Rev. & 'l'ax. Code, §§ 13801-13804)
(Estate of Stcchler (1925), 195 Cal. 386, 396 [3] [233 P.
972]). Since the various classes of transferees are accorded
different tax treatment under both the rate and exemption
statutes (e.g., a transferee included in Class A is taxed in
accordance with both the Class A rates (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ J 3401) and the Class A exemption (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13801) ) , it follows that the two types of statutes should be
eonstrued ·in pari maten:a (see In re Newberry's Estate
(1953), 138 W.Va. 296 [75 S.E.2d 851, 852 [1], 40 A.L.R.2d
624 J) , and the same rule (whether of strict or of liberal construction) should be applied to each type.
It is established that succession to the property of a decedent
is a privilege, not an inherent right, and that the various
states have plenary power over property subject to inheritance. (See Stebbins v. Riley (1925), 268 U.S. 137 [45 S.Ct.
424, 69 hEd. 884, 44 A.hR. 1454]; Magmtn v. Illinois Trust
& Sav. Bank (1898), 170 U.S. 283 [18 S.Ct. 594, 42 L.Ed.
1037] ; United States v. Perkins (1896), 163 U.S. 625, 629-630
116 S.Ct. 1073, 41 L.Ed. 287].) Thus a succession tax statute may constitutionally impose a tax on transfers in which
the rate does not vary with the relationship of the transferee to the decedent, and which does not allow any exemptions at all based on relationship. (E.g., see the statutes of
Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stats., § 42-1510) ; Florida (Fla. Stats.,
§ 198.02); and Mississippi (Miss. Code, § 9264).) Since the
fixing of different rates and exemptions among classes based
on degree of relationship is thus a matter of legislative grace,
not required by or obnoxious to either federal or state Constitutions (see Estate of Watkinson (1923), 191 Cal. 591,
597-598 [3-5] [217 P. 1073]; Estate of Potter (1922), 188
Cal. 55, 63 [ 6-7] [204 P. 826]), it follows that both the rate
and exemption statutes should properly be considered as
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subject to the rule that statutory tax concessions are to be
eonstrued liberally in favor of the state and strictly against
these claiming the indulgence offered.
Were it not for the specific provisions of seetion 13307,
subdivision (b), of the Revenue and Taxation Code (quoted
ante, p. 119), classifying a child adopted in conformity with
the laws of this state as a Class A transferee, such adopted
child would be subject to inheritance tax at the rates and
exemption applicable to strangers. (See In re Strunk's
Estate (1952), 369 Pa. 478 [87 A.2d 485, 487]; 28 Am.Jur.
102, § 196.) Although the beneficial tax status of a natural
child has been extended in California to children legally
adopted while under the age of 21, neither this extension nor
the actual adoption can obliterate the fact that genetically
such children are strangers to the blood of the foster parents.
(See Estate of Kruse (1953), 120 Cal.App.2d 254, 257 [260
P.2d 969]; see also In re Da1·ling (1916), 173 Cal. 221 [159
P. 606] .) Indisputably, an adjudication that a child bears
the equitable status of an adopted child does not effect a
change in the child's actual status of a blood stranger to the
adoptive parent. The provisions of section 13307, subdivision
(b), extend the beneficial rates and exemptions of sections
13401 and 13801 only to children adopted in conformity with
California law. Adoption is purely statutory in origin and
nature, and there cannot be an adoption without compliance
with the statutory requirements. (Matter of Cozza (1912),
163 Cal. 514, 522 [126 P. 161, Ann. Cas. 1914A 214] .) There
can be neither an equitable adoption (see In re Olson's Estate
(1955), 244 Minn. 449 [70 N.W.2d 107, 110]) nor an adoption
by estoppel (Adoption of Parker (1948), 31 Ca1.2d 608, 617
19] [191 P.2d 420] ). If the rule of strict construction of
tax exemption statutes is applied here, then it must be coneluded that the Class A exemption and rate statutes cannot be
extended to include a child not legally adopted, even though
he bears the "equitable status" of an adopted child.
It appears to me, from the foregoing discussion, that the
only way George Radovich could lawfully become entitled
to the status of a Class A transferee would be to establish that
he was ''adopted by the decedent in conformity with the laws
of this State, provided [he] was under the age of 21 years
at the time of such adoption." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13307,
subd. (b).) As noted above, adoption is purely statutory
in origin and to be valid must conform to the applicable statutes; here the findings and decree relied on by George to
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his equitable right to the transfer of decedent's
likewise establish that decedent ''did not institute
any statutory proceedings :for adoption.'' 'l'he only proceedrelied on to give George the status of an adopted child
is the probate proceeding to determine interests in the estate
of the decedent. That decree was not entered until George
was 37 years of age.
It is urged that the "laws of this State" contemplated
by section 13307, subdivision (b) of the Revenue and Taxation Code include not only the statutory law but also the decisional law, and that the decree of the probate court therefore satisfies the requisites of the tax statute. Even assuming
that the probate decree declaring that George had the equitable
status of an adopted son was tantamount to a decree of
adoption in conformity with the laws of this state, it is obvious
that George still does not qualify for Class A. exemption status
within the terms of section 13307, subdivision (b) because
the proceeding relied on to give George an adopted status
doe:;; not bring him within the age-at-adoption qualification.
Manifestly, the conclusion that George at the age of 37 was
by virtue of private contract in the equitable position of an
adopted son, cannot accomplish his legal or equitable adoption
before the age of 21.
Ko California case directly in point has been cited by the
parties, nor has any been discovered by independent research,
on the question of the effect of an equitable decree such as in
the present c~se on the status taxwise of the child involved.
However, there is substantial authority from other jurisdictions which supports the conclusion that the probate decree
did not adjudicate that George was either the adopted son
or the legal heir of the decedent. These authorities establish
the following general principles:
"[A]n adoption can be brought about only by a following
of the statutory procedure therefor; consequently, a mere
executory agreement to adopt, with nothing more, is not an
adoption, and the child is not an heir of the parties agreeing
to adopt it" (2 C.J.S. 399, § 27; Parnelle v. Cavanaugh
(1941), 191 Ga. 464 [12 S.E.2d 877, 878 [1]); Malaney v.
Cameron (1916), 99 Kan. 70,71 [161 P. 1180,1181 [1]]),
for the right to take as an heir exists only by operation of law
(O'Connor v. Patton (1926), 171 Ark. 626 [286 S.W. 822,
826]; Jordan v. Abney (1904), 97 Tex. 296 [78 S.W. 486,
4891), and cannot be created by contract (Wiseman v.
48 C.2d-5
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Guernsey (1922), 107 Neb. 647 [187 N.W. 55, 56 [1]]; Couch
v. Couch (1951), 35 Tenn.App. 464 [248 S.W.2d 327, 334
[5]]) or by estoppel (Glass v. Glass (1952, Ohio), 125 N.E.2d
375, 377 [3, 4]). However, under the principle that equity
will consider that done which ought to have been done, it is
generally held that a contract by a person to adopt the child
of another as his own, accompanied by a virtual, although
not a statutory adoption, may be enforced upon the death of
the obligor by adjudging the child entitled to a natural child's
share in the property of an obligor dying intestate. (2 C.J.S.
400, § 27, and cases cited therein.) "In upholding such a
remedy, the courts do not hold that the child is entitled to
the right of inheritance as an heir. They do not undertake
to change the status of either party, but merely to enforce a
contract which has been fully performed on one side." (2
C.J.S. 401, § 27; In re P.ainter's Estate (1954), 246 Iowa 307
[67 N.W.2d 617, 619]; Hickox v. Johnston (1923), 113 Kan.
99 [213 P. 1060, 1061, 27 A.L.R. 1322]; Starnes v. Hatcher
(1908), 121 Tenn. 330 [117 S.W. 219, 223]; but see Crawford
v. Wilson (1913), 139 Ga. 654 [78 S.E. 30, 32 [1], 44 L.R.A.
N.S. 773]; Lynn v. Hockaday (1901), 162 Mo. 111 [61 S.W.
885, 889, 85 Am.St.Rep. 480] .) When the child takes property in such a case it is as a purchaser by virtue of the contract (Couch v. Couch (1951, Tenn.), supra, 248 S.W.2d 327,
334 [6]) and by way of damages or specific performance
(Minetree v. Minetree (1930), 181 Ark. 111 [26 S.W.2d 101,
104 [3]]; Miller v. Elliot (1943), 266 App.Div. 428 [42 N.Y.S.
2d 569, 570]). The child does not become, in a legal sense, the
child of the adopting parents except for the purpose of receiving title to their property (Besche v. Murphy (1948), 190
Md. 539 [59 A.2cl499, 504 [9, 10]]) and is not entitled to letters of administration (State ex rel. Balshaw v. Montgomery
(1940), 237 Mo.App. 678 [146 S.W.2d 129, 132]). The child
shares in the estate of the deceased foster parent as though
his own child but not as such. In order to do justice and
equity, as far as possible, to one who, though having filled
the place of a natural born child, through inadvertence or
fault has not been legally adopted, the court enforces a contract under which the child is entitled to property, declaring
that as a consideration on the part of the foster parents a
portion of their property will pass on their death to the child.
( Chehak v. Battles (1907), 133 Iowa 107 [110 N.W. 330,
335, 12 Ann. Cas. 140, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 1130] .) And in such
case, property recompense is generally measured in the amount
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fixed by the statutes of descent and distribution. (Caulfield
v. Noonan (1940), 229 Iowa 955 [295 N.W. 466, 471 [1]];
Hickox v. Johnston (1924), 115 Kan. 845 [224 P. 905, 907];
1 Am.Jur. 631, § 20.) But in the absence of statutory adoption, it cannot be held that by enforcing such a contract a
legal adoption was effected (Roberts v. Sutton (1947), 317
J\Iich. 458 [27 N.W.2d 54, 57-58 [3, 4]]; In re Olson's Estate
(1955), supra, 244 Minn. 449 [70 N.W.2d 107, 110 [2-4]];
Franks v. Horrigan (1930), 120 Neb. 1 [231 N.W. 27, 29] ), or
that the child became an heir, even where the contract provided for a right of inheritance ( Cmtlfield v. Noonan, supra;
Ghehak v. Battles, supra). (For compilation and analysis of
authorities from many jurisdictions on the subject of'' Specific
performance of, or status of child under, contract to adopt
not fully performed,'' and the possible applicability therein
of the doctrine of estoppel, see notes in 171 A.L.R. 1315, 1326;
142 A.lJ.R. 84, 122; 27 A.L.R. 1325, 1365.)
Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, it
becomes clear that the order of the probate court adjudicated
no more than that by reason of the contract between the
decedent and George's natural parents, and what was done
by the latter and by George toward performing it, George became entitled to succeed to the decedent's estate to the same
extent that he would have taken had he been legally adopted.
In order to do equity, the probate court enforced the contract
insofar as property rights were concerned, but the order did
not declare George to be an heir or purport to change his
lega.l status; George remained a legal stranger for such things
as inheritance tax. The "finding" of the trial court in this
proceeding that the only way George could inherit was as an
adopted child, and that he must therefore be treated as such
for inheritance tax purposes, falls because George does not
either in fact or in law take as an heir. He takes because of
the contract performed by him and his parents and the breach
thereof by decedent.
Despite the fact that approximately 40 other jurisdictions
have inheritance tax statutes similar to those in California,
whereby a legally adopted child is allowed a higher exemption and taxed at a lower rate than ordinarily applies to
strangers to the blood of the decedent, only three cases have
been found which have considered a problem similar to that
before us here. All three of those cases support the conclusions heretofore reached.
In the case of In re Clark's Estate (1937), 105 Mont. 401
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[74 P.2d 401, 412 [18], 114 .A.I.J.R. 496], there had been a
contract to adopt the child, but the legal adoption had newr
been completed. The child was left certain property by the
will of the foster parent, and the inheritance tax authoritirs
assessed the child on the basis that he was a stranger to the
blood of the decedent. The child claimed that he was entitled
to the more beneficial tax treatment accorded to a "child
adopted as such in conformity with law'' (lliiont.Hev. Codes
1935, § 10400.2 [now Mont.Rev. Codes, § 91-4409] ), by
virtue of the contract of adoption, fully performed on his
part. The court reviewed the general rules -vvith respect to
contracts of adoption (as cited ante), and concluded that the
trial court had correctly held that, whether or not the child
could have enforced the contract against the estate of the
decedent, he was not ''a child adopted as such in conformity
with law," and the determination of the taxing authorities
was sustained.
In Lamb's Estate v. Mor-row (1908), 140 Iowa 89 [117 N.W.
1118, 18 hR..A.N.S. 226], the recipient of property from
the decedent claimed that he was entitled to the more favorable tax treatment accorded to an adopted child. He argued
that although he had not been legally adopted, he had been
equitably adopted, and that in fixing the tax the equitable aspects of the case should be considered. The court stated, beginning at page 1120: ''The answer to this is that the case
is not in equity, and if it were, the matters relied on cannot
make one an heir if in fact they do not in law establish that
relation . . . . Holmes docs not, in any event, take as an heir."
The same answer is equally applicable to the contentions of the
child here.
In Wooster v. Iowa State Tax Com. (1941), 230 Iowa 797
[298 N.W. 922, 141 .A.L.R. 1298], the child had not been
adopted under statutory procedure, but claimed to have been
adopted by estoppel. It was conceded that the foster parents
were estopped to deny the adoption. Property passed to the
child under the will of a foster parent, and the question was
whether the child was entitled to have the transfer assessed
at the lower inheritance tax rates and higher exemption applicable to a "legally adopted child . . . entitled to inherit
under the laws of this state." (Code of Iowa 1939, § 7313
rnow Iowa Code, § 450.10] .) After reviewing the authorities,
the court stated:
"The conclusion that Grace S. Wooster was not a legally
adouted child of Delia B. \Vooster appears inescapable. She
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, 1d not have the status of an adopted child or any right of
mheritanee as sueh. A decree establishing her rights in the
property of the deceased foster parents could not have
dwnged her previous status to that of an adopted child. The
principle ilwolved in such equitable proceedings is property
recompense measured in the amount fixed in the statutes of
descent and distribution . . .
'' .L\ppellee argues that the state is in such privity with
Delia B. Wooster as to be bound by the estoppel against her.
1n support of this contention it is said that the state allows
the party to fix the status of the child and should be bound
the status so fixed by its authority. With this statement
\le do not agree. 'rhe state, through its legislative enactments, allovYS the status of an adopted child to be fixed by
one method only, to wit, by statutory adoption. When such
status has been thus fixed the legally adopted child becomes
entitled to the exemption and classification provided by statute
for property passing to a legally adopted child. Obviously,
when a party fails to take the steps required by the state to
effectuate a legal adoption the estoppel against such party
resulting from such noncompliance with the statute does not
bar the state from standing upon the facts as they actually
exist in making classifications for inheritance tax purposes.
"Nor do we agree that a decree establishing appellee's
rights would constitute a judgment in rem determining her
status which would be binding upon the taxing authorities.
One reason for this is that appellee never had the status of
au adopted child and the courts 'do not undertake to change
the status.' Such decree would merely establish her property
rights." (Wooster v. Iowa State Tax Corn. (1941, Iowa),
supra, 298 N.W. 922, 925 [1-4] .) The reasoning in the
\V ooster case is equally pertinent here. (See also Adoption
Pad;er (1948), supra, 31 Cal.2d 608, 617 [9].)
'rhe so-called "heirship" proceedings in California are not
limited to those persons who claim to be technical heirs of the
decedent. Rather, the statute providing for such proceedings
states that ''any person claiming to be an heir of the decedent
or entitled to distribution of the estate or any part thereof"
may institute such proceedings. (Prob. Code, § 1080, italic:;;
added.) The mere determination of the rights to distribution
in such a proceeding is not necessarily a determination of
technical heirship. George petitioned the court for a "Derree Determining Interests" in the decedent's estate. The
eourt determined George's interest, and decreed distribution
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of the estate to him, not because he was an adopted son of
decedent, but because he should havr been decedent's adopted
son, and beeause, under the faets of this ease, he had higher
equities than any other elaimant. Sueh a deeree did not, nor
eould it, adjudieate George's status to be other than it
faetually was-i.e., a stranger to the blood of the deeedentand it did not purport to affeet his status for iuheritanee tax
purposes.
The order in the instant proeeeding (fixing the inheritanee
tax) is distinct from that in the heirship proceeding. Each
order is appealable (Prob. Code, § 1240; see also Attorney
General v. S'Uperior Court ( 1955), 41 Cal.2d 249, 251 [4]
[259 P .2d 1].) Such orders have "the force and effeet of a
judgment in a civil aetion" (Hev. & Tax. Code,§ 14672), and
"the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to
judgments, new trials, appeals, attachments, and execution of
judgments, so far as applicable, govern all [such] proceedings . . . " (Rev. & 'fax. Code, § 14671.) " [I] n fixing the
inheritanee tax the probate court may consider matters not
before it in the distribution of an estate . . . . The order
fixing inheritance taxes, which may incidentally determine
questions in regard to suecession and beneficial ownership, is
not binding except for tax purposes as between those who
claim the estate, whether as heirs, legatees, or beneficiaries
of a trust extrinsic to the will. (In re Lloyd's Estate, 106
Cal.App. 507 [289 P. 892].)" (Estate of Rath (1937), 10
Cal.2d 399, 406 [75 P.2d 509, 115 A.L.R. 836].) 'l'he Lloyd
ease referred to in the Rath opinion recognizes that an inheritanee tax proceeding is completely separate from a proceeding to determine distribution of the estate, and that an
adjudication of tax status in the one proceeding will not prevent a different adjudication of status with regard to the right
to take in the distribution proceeding. 'l'he converse is
equally true where, as here, the distribution proeeeding only
purports to determine the right to take and not the tax status
of the one taking.
The ease of Johnson v. Superior Court (1929), 102 Cal.
App. 178 [283 P. 331], is not opposed to the principles
enuneiated herein. The Johnson case merely holds that the
probate eourt has power to determine the rights of one claiming an interest in the deeedent 's estate by virtue of an executory contract to adopt. That the probate court has such power,
and that it exercised such power in the present case, is undisputed. But the determination that George was equitably
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in privity with the estate and therefore entitled to distribution of the property does not determine in what manner
George (or the transfer) is to be treated for tax purposes.
rrhc right to distribution of the estate having been determined,
the transfer and the transferee became subject to the inheritance tax laws. The duly appointed inheritance tax apclassified George as a Class D transferee and reported
the inheritance tax on such classification. The coadministrators and George filed objections to the appraiser's report
pursuant to the authorities of section 14510 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code. At the hearing it was the duty of the
court to presume that the report of the tax appraiser was
correct and the burden was upon the objector to proceed in
support of his objection. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 14512.) The
inheritance tax authorities in setting the tax were entitled
to fix George's tax status under the tax laws in accordance
with the facts as they actually stood. One of those facts was
the probate decree of distribution, and this the tax authorities relied on for exactly what it held-that George, under
equitable principles, was entitled to take a certain amount of
property. 'l'he probate decree determined how much property
George was to take and why he was entitled to it, but did
not determine in what taxable capacity he was to take it.
'l'he latter determination was made by the court in this entirely separate and distinct proceeding. Such determination
is erroneous as a matter of law and should, if the law were
followed, lead to a reversal.
McComb, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 10,
1957. Schaner, .T., and McComb, ,J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

